

May 5th

Not ready to decide yet on Nike X and Arrow & scale of
on longer term program now. Air Force & Cong. support
for the necessary full scale Arrow program is still uncertain.

Because of M.I. intercept, we will still be continuing production of M.I. II;
if longer range required, we can buy with no loss in lead time
or production re-start costs.

Comprehensive mod. program to convert all known units of B-52s
(except B). Now, study additional mod. to increase the
utility of this force into the 70's.

Wait for C-2, -3, -4

After decision on develop. & procurement of Advanced Tactical Bomber (ATB).

CBM reliability - large numbers of minutes for after. That figure.
(~35/yr)

IN SOP PACAF

Lack of fuel, weather, navigation errors, etc., may prevent pilot from reaching primary target; or he may observe target to be destroyed. He will have an alternate target assigned, and be briefed to strike it instead.

Before hostilities, TOT's reported in hours and minutes from E-hour. After hostilities, TOT's submitted as DTG ZULU time.

ATPOS reports submitted: by OI message as soon as operations permit, for targets with preplanned duplication; others, as operations dictate, normally not more frequently than hourly.

Strike plans submitted: normal with 7 variations:

- a) primary day-good weather
- primary night/AW
- c) Normal day/good weather
- d) normal night/AW
- e) deployed primary day/good weather
- f) deployed primary night/AW
- g) deployed ~~xi~~ day/good weather
- h) deployed night/AW

Normal and primary strike plans based on tactical warning; deployed strike plans based on strategic warning. After E-hour, strike plans no longer valid will be cancelled.

Korea: Com attack might begin with fabricated but plausible incident against Com forces.

Com objectives: a) To overrun South Korea, or b) to cause the UN/US to commit additional forces in South Korea in connection with pre-planned actions elsewhere in the free world.

For psychological advantage, Coms would probably not use atomic weapons, at least until used against them.

US should use atomics, if such use will bring aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on balance of political and military consideration, such use best advance US security interests. It is assumed that ~~USMACV~~ PACOM would be authorized to use them.

If used, restrict them to ensure: accomplishment of mission; minimize destruction; localize conflict so far as possible; Communists have an opportunity to capitulate locally in Korea before the hostilities are unduly expanded.

Partial implementation of plan: if reinforcements not available; if nuclear weapons are not allowed. (Counterattack phase may be infeasible; withdrawal may be required).

With 2 mile CEP and .5 MT warhead, Polaris will be used against primary governmental control centers and industrial base of SU and China. List of 156 target complexes in Russia (28 will not be targeted now) and 25 in China.

Maintain 55% of all Polaris subs submerged in patrol areas ready to fire. Early ones in Norwegian Sea. (alternate: Med). Later: WestPac.

Total sub force needed (55% on patrol) for unilateral destruction of target complexes: 75 in Western Russia—26; 118 in Western SU—36; 128 in Western and Eastern SU—40; 153 in Russia and China—47.

Control and coordination by unified commanders in the area, through their naval component commanders. (initially CINCLANT). (later CINCEUR, CINCPAC).

Advantages of Polaris:

1) Insures inevitable retaliation; 2) system is flexible—missiles can be launched promptly, or with deliberation; 3) compared to other systems, it will be immune to surprise attack, thus insuring ability to deliver weapons carried; 4) does not depend on vulnerable warning and defense systems for survival; 5) because of high survivability, possible to realistically establish long-range force and budgetary requirements; 6) system is independent of foreign control; 7) forces can easily be redeployed in response to national requirements; 8) blunting attacks against Polaris subs will not endanger US populations.

In Westpac: out of 26 on patrol, 2 against SU targets, 4 against ~~SINO~~ Chicom targets.

VLF stations: Maryland, T.H., Washington; one under lease in Japan; maintenance station at Haiku, T.H. and Balboa, Panama Canal Zone; one under construction at Washington County, Maine; one planned for Guam.

Limited or finite target system (possible because of SU concentration) which, if attacked, would destroy the Soviet will to continue the war.

10 USSR targets in Far East.

First SSBN will be supported from CONUS (Norway is closest patrol area); Norwegian Sea offers, initially, more reliable communications; navigational aids are equal to those in Med; politically, desirable to locate first tender in UK port rather than any other ally.

Second group should operate in Med.

Require 1/3 fatalities with 90% confidence; assume system reliability of 80%, attrition due to enemy countermeasures of 5%; total system degradation, hence, of 25%. Air burst.

National requirements: a) to deter Sino-Soviet authority from calculated resort to general war, by threat of reducing its industrial and governmental control base to a state of impotency; b) If general war is forced upon us, to reduce the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a condition which will permit the US to survive as a world leader and pursue its remaining objectives.

US will not rely overly on any single weapon system to meet requirements; this would simplify enemy's problems and he would know where to direct his counter-efforts.

Nuclear testing

US currently ahead in stockpile and quality (yield-weight ratio, flexibility, knowledge of special effects); but gap will be narrowed with or without testing. As for breakthroughs, without testing advantage will lie with nation which maintains higher level of effort, security, and will take risks on conducting clandestine tests, abrogate treaties or stockpile without testing.

Effects at ultra-high altitudes: for AICR; small warheads for tactical, Asw; small, ready warheads for air defense; clean weapons in middle and low yields; safe weapons. Limitations on yield can be overcome (e.g. by SU) by larger payloads, greater accuracy, greater number.

Disarmament:

4th country problem doesn't jeopardize security of the US; SU wouldn't give weapons to its satellites anyway, so problem is of more concern to SU; in hands of allies, nuclear weapons would strengthen US alliances. NATO relies on nuclears. No immediate budgetary savings: contract obligations, mothballing, installation of system...

Mere agreement on an inspection system might constitute moral obligation on US to desist from certain activities--before inspection system was actually in effect. And difficult for US to abrogate agreement (note Korean Armistice Agreement; Coms violate).